Ideas from 'Troubles with Functionalism' by Ned Block [1978], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Philosophy of Mind' (ed/tr Beakley,B /Ludlow P) [MIT 1992,0-262-52167-9]].

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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

2584	Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

2582	A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour

2574	Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism

2576	In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations

2575	Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries

2583	You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique

2578	Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?

2585	Not just any old functional network will have mental states

2586	In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

2579	Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines

2577	Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine

2580	A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax

2581	Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not